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2004) 
 
Learning from the Victoria Climbié Inquiry   
 
 Michael Rustin 
 
The effectiveness of services responsible  for the care  of children in Britain 
has on many occasions  over recent years been brought to public attention by  
disastrous  failures  to protect children in need.  These have often been cases 
which have led to the death of an individual child -  these include among 
others  Maria Colwell (1973), Jasmine Beckford (1984), Tyra Henry (1984), 
Kimberley Carlile (1986) and  Victoria Climbié  in February 2000.  Another 
event  given huge public attention was the multiple diagnosis of child sexual 
abuse and consequent removal of children into care in Cleveland in1987.  
Such cases have on several occasions been investigated by quasi-judicial 
Inquiries,  whose published Reports have then become central documents in 
public discussion and in government decision-making.  Since these inquiries 
have invariably found  that poor or negligent professional practice was in part 
responsible  for the fate of the children concerned, they have led to a great 
deal of public criticism of the relevant services, and in particular of social 
work.  It is clear that the reputation and self-esteem of the social work 
profession has been gravely affected by these highly-publicised events and 
by the Inquiries and published Reports have so often followed them.  
 
The Victoria Climbié Inquiry is thus the latest in a long line. Its Report1 has 
two very considerable merits. The first is that its  author, Lord Laming,  has 
responded with deep seriousness to the terrible  fate of Victoria Climbié 
herself. No-one can read the Report and not be moved by its descriptions of 
Victoria’s last days of captivity and virtual torture, confined to a bath in the 
most pitiful conditions. It is clear that the persistence and thoroughness of the 
Inquiry were animated throughout by the memory of what had happened to 
                                            
1
 The Victoria Climbié Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Lord Laming. Cmd 5730  HMSO. 
January 2003.  Available on-line at www.victoria-climbie-inquiry.org.uk 
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this child, and  by a determination to find out how this had come and how 
such an event could be prevented in the future. The  Report’s second merit is 
its  rigorous investigation of what had happened to bring this catastrophe 
about. It sets out in meticulous detail the sequence of events which took place 
as the case came to the attention, or inattention,  of various public services, 
and describes the discussions, communications, and actions  which followed 
at each point.  We learn a great deal about who did what in relation to this 
case, and about how, when, and where, their various actions and inactions 
took place.   
 
As the Report makes clear, and as has been widely noted,  each of the major 
public services which had responsibility for the child performed exceedingly 
badly, social services, hospitals, and the police all  failing to respond 
appropriately to the needs of the child.  Doctors, police officers, and social 
workers, repeatedly failed to take actions that they should have taken, 
according to recognised procedures, and in implementation of their own prior 
decisions. Any one of several such actions might have saved Victoria’s life.  
The Report’s many Recommendations have largely been formulated in 
response to the analysis of these defects of practice. It identifies many 
necessary improvements in the location of professional responsibilities, in 
inter-agency communication, in operational procedures, and  in record 
keeping and information systems, which if implemented would, it may be 
assumed,  make such catastrophes less likely to occur in the future.  
 
However while the Report is thorough and acute in its ascribing  of  particular 
responsibilities - often  individual ones -  for the tragic misconduct of the case, 
there are some broader explanatory questions which it scarcely addresses.  
There is in the first place the problem of what can be reasonably inferred from 
a particular case such as this, taking place  as it did in the sphere of 
responsibility of several agencies in inner London boroughs, for the condition 
of child protection services across the country.  How representative of 
prevailing practice is the poor standard of practice which was manifested in 
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this one case?  How can valid recommendations for improvements in services 
be made without evidence not only of  what happened in this instance,  but 
concerning  the standard of practice which prevails more generally?  No such 
broader evidence is adduced by the Report, nor does the further investigation 
which might produce such evidence figure  as one of its numerous  
recommendations.    
 
Typical and Untypical Practices 
The question of how  representative or otherwise this case is of broader 
practices has two dimensions.  One concerns the  individual case itself.  Did 
Victoria suffer because of qualities particular to herself and to the adults in 
whose care she was, and if so, in what ways?  The Report does indicate 
some case-specific factors which were probably relevant to its outcome. It 
refers for example to the difficulties of joint working between social services 
and police brought about  by ethnic dimensions - for example, the reported 
suspicion by social workers of police insensitivity's and prejudices towards 
black people, and some consequent police reluctance work with social 
services staff.   The fact that Marie-Therese Kouao, Victoria’s great-aunt and 
foster-carer, had recently come to London from Paris, was mainly French-
speaking, and originally came like Victoria from the Ivory Coast, was another 
significant factor, impeding the services in establishing contact and 
communication with her.  Another aspect of the  family’s origins and situation 
were not, however, made much of in the Inquiry Report.  This is the evident  
ambivalence of some of the services concerned, and indeed of the wider 
society at this time, to migrants, even legal migrants such as Kouao and 
Victoria who came to Britain from France, a fellow-member of the European 
Union.  Migrants like this   seeking housing and other support from the 
welfare services have hardly been made welcome in the United Kingdom in 
these years.  Kouao, as the Report refers to her, was perceived to be seeking 
housing support from the local authority, and there was suspicion that  she 
was  manipulative in her dealings with its officers for this reason. Although  
public responsibility for the well-being of a child was accepted, at least to a 
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degree, it seems possible  that some of the stigma and hostility being more 
broadly  attached  to refugees at this time was a factor in the misrecognition 
of and official  indifference to the situation of this family. At one point Kouao 
and Victoria were believed by social workers,  on no good  evidence, to have 
returned to France.  It seems clear that had they indeed done so many of 
those concerned with the case would have been relieved that their 
responsibility had been removed.  The Inquiry Report does not explore the 
possibility that animosity towards refugees in this period may have been a 
contributing factor to the neglect of Victoria’s needs, or indeed that other 
children who are in this situation might now for the same reasons be at risk.  
 
A second question about the case, so far as its representative status is 
concerned,  relates to its particular geographical  and administrative location.  
One might in principle wonder whether a single case is ever a valid indicator 
of the general  quality of a particular local service.  But in this case  the extent 
of the failures of the various services engaged does perhaps give good 
reason to be concerned about their prevailing  standard. The failures that 
were uncovered did not seem to be wholly contingent, for example the result 
of  weaknesses of individual professionals, such as are bound to occur in any 
organisation.  Lord Laming comments sharply on the failure of the Social 
Services managers to accept  appropriate  responsibility for what had taken 
place under their authority, thus suggesting a deeper-rooted  problem.  And 
while he commends the senior police witnesses for their candour and 
acceptance of ultimate responsibility, he also notes generic weakness of the 
units responsible for child protection in two  inner London police services.  But 
even if  one accepts that this Inquiry into a single case - ‘a single case study’, 
if one thinks of it by analogy with  research procedures – can  throw  light on 
the larger context of the case,  this does not settle the question  of what is the 
relevant context is.  Can this case be taken to reveal service deficiencies 
merely in the four London boroughs investigated (Haringey, Ealing, Brent and 
Enfield were all involved with the case to some degree), in inner London more 
widely, in deprived inner city areas across Britain,  or of  child care services 
throughout the nation? On the basis of what evidence is this crucial question 
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to be answered?   Surely deciding on the scope and  extent of the service 
failures which have been identified is absolutely fundamental to drawing any 
valid  conclusions from them.  How can useful recommendations to improve 
policy and practice be made from a single case, if there  are  no grounds for 
knowing how representative of normal practice the single case is? Indeed, if 
one hopes to  devise  policies and procedures  that can  be expected to be 
effective,  one needs understanding of how good practice is achieved  at least 
as much as anatomies of failure.      
 
Explanations of Failure    
By what methods should one try to explain serious failures in organisational 
and professional practice, such as occurred in the Victoria Climbié case?  
One approach is a  predominantly judicial one. This is primarily concerned to 
establish the responsibility and guilt of individuals, and it  adapts the method 
of the law in order to establish not legal guilt,  but professional, bureaucratic 
or more broadly human fault or failure.  This was  the  model underlying the 
procedures of this Inquiry, like others of its kind, which were usually 
conducted by lawyers.2   Since this approach is primarily concerned with 
assigning responsibilities to individuals, it is largely uninterested in broader 
social scientific  or ‘systemic’ kinds of explanation, and is poorly adapted to 
investigating causes or dimensions of this kind. The  quasi-judicial form of 
investigation can cope readily with questions of who did what, when, how and 
where. It can perhaps  address the question of ‘why’ in  seeking evidence of 
an individual’s motivation or state of mind when in a particular situation.  Such  
broader  dimensions may be brought out by way of mitigation, as occasionally 
in this Report  when individuals are admitted to have been overloaded in their 
work, or under-trained for their responsibilities.   But conceptions  such that a 
problem may be generated by a systemic institutional failure, or by a 
maladaptative culture, or by pervasive  anxiety,3  are unlikely to be addressed 
                                            
2
 The Victoria Climbié Inquiry is an exception - Lord Laming is an eminent social worker, and a 
former Chief Inspector of Social Services.  
3
 Margaret Rustin, in a paper (‘Conceptual Analysis of Critical Moments in Victoria’s Life’) 
given at a Tavistock Clinic Conference on these issues on October 10th 2003  explored the 
unconscious anxieties which undermined the capacity of the professional network to take in 
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within a quasi- judicial framework like that of the Inquiry’s. Where the primary 
task   is to attribute  individual responsibilities,  which is what courts and their 
analogues normally do, explanations which invoke such contextual or 
environmental factors may  even seem like unjustified pleas of mitigation or 
exoneration by individuals who have failed in their responsibilities.4   
 
Where the prime objective is to locate individual responsibilities, reflective 
thought may also be put aside by the pressing need for individuals to defend 
and rationalise their actions.  The legal representation which witnesses to the 
Inquiry had available to them may be , effective in ensuring a measure of 
justice and fairness, but it is not conducive to open-minded reflection, in which 
the admission of misjudgement or negligence may be the precondition for 
understanding what was in the minds of participants, and why they acted as 
they did.  I don’t think we really learn from this Report how those involved with 
the case themselves interpret, understand, and evaluate what happened in its 
course.  But surely at some level their testimony and reflections must be vital 
to a full understanding of the situation.  
 
If  the larger system in which practitioners found themselves is indeed 
seriously malfunctioning, then we are unlikely to avoid such disasters in future 
if  the larger malfunctions, as well as the failings of individual practitioners, are 
not addressed.  If, for example,  inadequate levels of training, insufficient or 
poor professional supervision,  a management remote from the primary work 
it is supposedly managing, lack of qualified staff,  and poor relationships 
between different agencies and professions, are all  factors leading to 
inadequate individual work,  improvement is unlikely to take unless such 
problems are addressed.   ‘Responsibility’, in the real sense, lies here, in 
these determining conditions, and with those who shape them, and not only 
                                                                                                                             
the facts of the case, and thus to respond to Victoria’s needs.  This paper can be obtained on 
request  from MRustin@tavi-nhs.port.org 
4
 Appointed inspectors have tended to displace independent social scientists as the main  
providers of evidence on which to base government policy in recent years. The starting-point 
of this trend was the denunciation of the 'establishment' of academic education researchers by 
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with the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ who administer these systems on an 
individual  basis. Indeed, one can say that a form of Inquiry that only seriously 
examines practitioner-failures, and  gives little attention to the broader 
preconditions of these, is in effect  shrugging off responsibilities that really 
belong to the larger society and its organisation, which  should not be largely 
attributed to its front-line workers. 
 
What struck me in reading the Inquiry Report is how many occasions there 
were in which any one individual among  many could have made a difference 
to Victoria’s fate,  just by taking the responsibility on to themselves.  No-one 
ever seems to felt strongly enough that  the evidence of harm and risk to this 
child was  such that something must be done to  investigate it further. 
Doctors, police officers, and social workers, even nurses,  were all at different 
moments in a position to have insisted on relevant action being taken. If any 
of them  had, it seems likely that someone else  involved would have 
accepted the necessity for this and given their  support. The Climbié case did 
not actually disappear from official sight –  formal procedures ensured that it 
remained more-or-less on the agenda of several agencies  for many months -  
but no-one took it up with the urgency it called for.   It  reminds one of the 
notorious Kitty Genovese incident which took place in the United States in 
1964 where a crowd of neighbours  around a tenement  courtyard saw and 
heard a murder taking place,  over a period of half an hour,   and  no no-one 
actually did   anything to help,  even by phoning  the police.5  What 
researchers have reported  induces citizens to intervene in such cases is on 
the one hand a sense of self-confidence in individuals, and on the other a 
sense of having a latent relationship to other bystanders, such that they can 
be presumed to share some common feelings and standards. In the  Victoria 
Climbié case, it seems both that the relevant professional self-confidence was 
widely lacking, and that different professionals were relating to one another as 
                                                                                                                             
the Thatcher government, and its installation of the Ofsted regime under Chris Woodhead as 
its  preferred source of information and advice on schooling.   
5
  See  Rosenthal, A.M. Thirty-Eight Witnesses: The Kitty Genovese Case. Berkeley : 
University of California Press, 1999.  
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virtual strangers,  as if they were members of  alien organisations, not as 
members of a multi-disciplinary professional community  sharing a common 
commitment. The arguments that went on about whether child protection 
committee meetings should take place in one agency’s premises, or another, 
were symptomatic of this lack of a common identification.  The professional 
culture around this case seemed to be in a state of fragmentation and 
lassitude. The informal culture of an organisation or network is often as 
influential as its formal rules in shaping its day-to-day activities. Indeed 
sometimes formal regulations are little more than a skeleton whose animation 
depends on much interaction that is unspecified or improvised,  as normal life 
proceeds.  The rules, like most job specifications, are  necessary,  but they 
are rarely sufficient to make things work.   
 
Lord Laming’s Recommendations 
The Inquiry Report makes no less than 108 recommendations to improve 
child protection services and practice.  The first General set of  these is for 
‘Structural Change’. The Report proposes a new administrative framework for 
these services, through the establishment of a ministerial Children and 
Families Board, and a National Agency for Children and Families to report to 
it.  It is recommended that local authorities should replicate this structure at 
their territorial  level, with a Committee for Members for Children and Families 
and a Management Board for Services for Children and Families. One of the 
tasks of the new National Agency should be to undertake or oversee the 
conduct of serious case reviews.  Thus not only is a significant reorganisation 
of government proposed on the basis of a single serious case-review, but 
such ‘hard cases’ are in future to be accorded similar centrality.  No 
justification is given in the Report of this approach to policy-making. But soon 
after  the Report was published, the  government announced that it proposed 
to bring about major changes in the child protection system, in the light of the 
Report's recommendations.  Since it is unlikely that governments really do 
make major decisions on such ad hoc grounds, it seems more likely that the 
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Climbié case and the Inquiry that it gave rise to has provided a populist 
rationalisation for what government  for other reasons considered to be a 
desirable development.   
 
The remaining 91 Recommendations are directed in turn to the major 
agencies with responsibility for child protection services – Social care, Health 
care, and the Police.  These recommendations are largely for improvements 
in operating practices and procedures. They require that records be kept in all 
cases, that appropriately qualified professionals take appropriate decisions, 
that investigations are promptly undertaken  about children where deliberate 
harm is suspected, and are then implemented, that information systems are 
improved6, that greater priority is given to child protection services, that 
specialist training is given, that services become properly  co-ordinated, etc.. 
 
These recommendations seem reasonable ones, though it is not clear which 
of them represent proposed changes in existing procedures, and which of 
them merely re-state what is already prescribed.  Can it be, for example, that 
social services child and family intake teams are not already supposed to 
have experience in working with children, and to have received appropriate 
training?  Or that when social services staff discover that a child they are 
assessing is not attending school they are not already expected to inform the 
education authorities of this fact?  What Lord Laming appears to have done in 
formulating many of his Recommendations is to note what was not done 
adequately in the Climbié case, and then recommend that what evidently 
should have been done then should be a standard procedure in future. But it 
does not seem sufficient  to advocate changes in procedure without detailed 
reference to those which are already in use. Such an approach could indeed 
encourage  mindless compliance to specific rules, (the ticking of endless new 
                                            
6
 Improvement in IT systems surely could make a significant difference in these cases, given 
the history of  failed, unreadable and mislaid communications that bedevilled the case.  
Perhaps this is something that the new agencies proposed by Lord Laming will investigate on 
a systematic basis.  Whether such improvements should  include the National Data Base for 
Children that the Report recommended is another matter.  
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boxes) rather than unified attention to the whole system of responsibilities and 
practices in which any set of procedures must be located. 7 
 
Bureaucratic and Holistic Models  of Service Provision  
The Inquiry Report does make its own connection between the behaviour of 
individuals and the larger institutional structure to which they belong, and by 
which they are employed.  Its recommendations make clear where this 
connection is held to lie.  The intervening dimension on which it relies to 
organise and connect up individual behaviours is that of rules and 
procedures, compliance with which is to be enforced by a hierarchical 
management structure.  This is an essentially bureaucratic model of 
organisation, even though it is conceded that within this rule-bound structure 
individual professionals are going to be required to exercise discretion and 
judgement.  
 
One of the largest issues in current debates about the desired ‘improvements’ 
in public services now revolves around the question of how adequate such a 
bureaucratised model of service-delivery and its management  is.  Are there 
dimensions of the process of delivering services that it leaves out, or 
marginalises, that need to be present if improvement is to be achieved?  Is it 
likely, for example, that child care services would be sufficiently improved if 
Lord Laming’s Recommendations were followed? Or indeed is it likely that 
they will be followed in practice if the broader dimensions of the situation that 
led to the Victoria Climbié  tragedy are not first understood? 
 
                                            
7
 The Government, in the Secretary of State's immediate response to the publication of the 
Report on January  28th 2003, annnounced in fact that it proposed to rationalise the 1500 
pages of guidance to which the 1989 Children Act and its successor Acts had given rise into a 
unified document of only one tenth the length, and it also  (re-) announced the extension of 
qualifying social work training from two to three years, a long overdue development. Whilst 
pursuing the standard agenda of holding responsible individuals to account and increased 
inspections, it thus also addressed some of the more holistic issues.  Its considered position is 
set out in the Green Paper 'Every Child Matters' which is now out for consultation. This 
document can be accessed on  the Web at http://www.dfes.gov.uk/everychildmatters/  
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What might these dimensions be?   This is the topic for a separate 
investigation, some of the materials for which exist in some of the valuable  
evidence submitted to the Inquiry  (it is freely accessible on-line) which is 
however barely referred to in the body of the Report. (The reports of the 
seminars to which those invited to give evidence contributed are also  
disappointing 8).  But among these dimensions is  certainly the quality of 
professional training and supervision available to staff, in all the services 
scrutinised by the Inquiry but especially in social services and the police.  
Demands by the Report that all social workers should be qualified for working 
with children are largely  pieties, given both the shortage of qualified social 
workers in London, and also the inadequate quality of training that many 
qualified social workers have received, and the perfunctory nature of much 
that is offered by way of continuing professional development. The Report 
notes that social services managers appeared to distance themselves from 
responsibility for what their front-line workers were doing, but chooses not to 
note that this might now  be a systemic deficiency, brought about by the weak 
and repeatedly undermined professional identity of social workers. In strong 
professions, such as medicine, or most academic disciplines,  those  in 
management positions retain their commitment to a community of values 
shared at all levels. In weak professions, like social work, there are continuing 
pressures for senior staff to redefine their role in generic ‘management’ terms, 
weakening their grasp of and influence over the professional culture of the 
knowledge-base and professional culture of their field.   
 
It is necessary for professionals working in child care, as in all other 
professions primarily concerned with human relationships, to remain open to 
experience, to retain a desire to understand, and on the basis of such 
understanding make assessments.9 It is a notable feature of the Climbié case 
that no-one ever seems ever to have been very interested to understand 
                                            
8
 The seminar reports make a few gestures in a holistic direction, for example in 17.70,  on  
the need for a 'learning culture'. But these do not offset  the  proceduralist emphasis of  the  
whole Report.    
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either Victoria, or her great-aunt, Marie-Therese Kouao, even though such a 
desire to understand could have been of fundamental value.  Kouao is viewed 
in the Report in the light of the cruel  outcome of her care of Victoria, as 
though the end of the case so far as her behaviour was  concerned always 
lay in its beginning.  No-one seems to have thought to find out why the child 
was in such evident trouble, and whether Kouao might have been offered any 
help in looking after her.  The Report is silent on what was believed to have 
happened to bring about Victoria’s cruel captivity – what seems to have been 
a descent into near-madness of her carers. The child’s bedwetting seems 
have been a visible symptom of these difficulties, as of course were her 
evident injuries.  One wonders if a conversation with Kouao intended not from 
the first to seek a case for prosecution, but to ascertain if a relationship of 
some trust might have been established with her, could have averted this 
disaster.  After all, one question one might ask is  what would have to have 
happened for the child to be brought to the hospital not when she was already 
dying, but earlier when there would still have been hope for her. 
 
A further question concerns what one might broadly call the problems of 
scarcity in social care, the fact that there is simply not time and resources to 
do everything equally well in difficult conditions, especially in areas of high 
social stress, such as that in which the Climbié case occurred. The  Report 
seeks to impose obligations on services, including hospitals, to give the 
highest priority to suspected cases of deliberate injury to children. But in 
reality, is it not reasonable for medical services to determine priorities by the 
evident risk to life of their patients, not by the origins of injuries or illness that 
might lead to death?  Any change in the order of priority given to one activity, 
necessarily reduces the priority to be given to another. What particular 
displacement of concerns did  the Inquiry Report have in mind when it came 
to its recommendations? Plainly, none, since its frame of reference was one 
in which  insistence on priorities in one part of a service does not require that 
                                                                                                                             
9
 Andrew Cooper, Rachael Hetherington and Ilan Katz's short book Risk Factor, The Making 
the child protection system work by  Andrew Cooper, Rachael Hetherington, and Ilan Katz 
(Demos 2003) proposes ways in which such space for reflection might be provided.  
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anyone first thinks about the implications of this for any other.  This is what I 
mean by referring to the absence of any systemic or holistic dimension in the 
Report’s analysis of the problems. 
 
It seems to be that this Report replicates the deficiencies not only of a certain 
dominant style of public service management,  specifying objectives and 
insisting on compliance at the expense of recognition of the complexity of 
tasks and the capabilities necessary to cope with them, but also of the 
inspection regimes which have grown up to audit and supervise them.  An 
Inquiry like this has the form and function of an Extraordinary Inspection, and 
is liable to be as mechanistic and unimaginative in its response to the 
problems revealed as many current public service inspections now are.10 
 
Ways Forward  
Some of the Evidence submitted to the Inquiry suggests some alternative 
lines of approach to the problems exposed by the Inquiry.  For example, 
Professor Colin Pritchard’s evidence, from the University of Southampton, 
draws attention to the improvement in child safety that has taken place in the 
UK over recent decades, and to the evidence of who, from the evidence, the 
different  perpetrators of injury to children are most liable to be, (He draws 
attention to psychiatric risks, and points out that this was one dimension to 
which professionals might have been more attentive in their interactions with 
Kouao.)11  He also reports on a project which has integrated school, health 
and social services provision in Dorset which indicates that a non-
stigmatising, preventive approach can produce much better and more cost-
effective outcomes than current fragmented methods which focus on 
intervention at later stages of neglect and harm.12 Sir William Utting, like Lord 
Laming a former Chief Inspector of Services, expressed his scepticism about 
                                            
10
 On this see M.J. Rustin ‘Rethinking Audit and Inspection’, paper given at a Tavistock Clinic 
Policy Seminar on October 17 2003. (Available on request from author).  
11
 Margaret Rustin’s paper, cited above, also explores the state of mind of Victoria and her 
great aunt, as far as the evidence allows.  
12
 In fact, school-based prevention systems are an important element in the Government's 
'Every Child Matters' Green Paper proposals, referred to above.  
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organisational restructuring as a remedy, and drew attention to the 
fundamental importance of high levels of professional training and capability. 
Julia Ross, Director of Social Services and Chief Executive of the Primary 
Care Trust in Barking and Dagenham, argued that ' it is not the structures, but 
the cultures, the people, and the systems failures that need addressing.'   
One can see a distinction in much of the evidence submitted to the Inquiry 
between those who subscribe to proceduralist and bureaucratic approaches 
to service-improvement and those who favour more systemic and holistic  
approaches. It is a great advance in the methodology of such Inquiries (it was 
also a merit of the Hutton Inquiry) that they now lead to the placing in the 
public domain of such a valuable body of evidence and argument.13 
 
The setting up of new overseeing Agencies, such as Lord Laming proposes 
for children and family services, does not in itself prescribe the methods by 
which they will work. There is an opportunity for these new agencies to 
address the problems of child and family services in a more holistic and open-
minded way than is done through most of this Report.  They could, for 
example, commission research studies to ascertain  by what methods 
effective child and family services deliver their good results, and what 
differentiates successful forms of practice from unsuccessful ones.  They 
could explore the needs of training,  and the optimal forms of management, 
for these services, in an open-minded spirit. They could ask for a review  of 
the current systems of audit and inspection of these services, which after all 
failed to detect or  remedy the gross malfunctions which led to the crisis 
revealed by the Victoria Climbié case.  
 
There is an opportunity for the new structures to review the services 
accountable to them in a fundamental way.  This may not have been what 
Lord Laming had in mind when he recommended that they be established, 
                                            
13
  The submissions of on-line evidence to the Climbié Inquiry would be made more accessible 
by a clearer list of contents and an index.    
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but it could be an outcome of his Report’s recommendations which would be 
of lasting value.  
_______________ 
 
Comments can be addressed to   m.j.rustin@uel.ac.uk 
